package-trust-check Skill
调查某个特定 npm 包是否可信——维护者/所有权被接管迹象、发布来源不匹配,以及危险的安装脚本。当用户询问某个具体包是否安全、被入侵、被劫持、可疑或"能不能信任"时使用——不适用于审计整个 package.json/lockfile(见 dependency-audit),也不适用于"X 是干什么的"这类纯事实性问题。
安装方式:把技能目录放入 ~/.claude/skills/(Claude Code)或在 claude.ai 设置中启用;也可复制右侧安装命令一键添加。
技能指令原文(SKILL.md)
NPMScan package trust check
Use this skill when the user names one specific package (optionally a
version) and asks a trust question about it — "is X safe to use," "was X
compromised," "should I be worried about X," "check X's maintainers." This
is a deep, single-package investigation: it runs checks dependency-audit
deliberately skips for every package in a batch because they're too
expensive to run at scale.
If the user instead pastes a package.json/lockfile/dependency list or asks
to audit multiple packages, use the dependency-audit skill instead — don't
run this skill's checks across a whole inventory. If the question is purely
factual with no trust/safety angle ("what does lodash do," "what's the
latest version of express"), just answer directly with get_package — don't
invoke the full investigation for that. If the user is instead choosing
between candidates for something not yet installed ("should we add X," "X
vs Y for this job"), that's a forward-looking pick, not a trust
investigation — use the new-dependency-evaluation skill.
Connecting the npmscan tools
This skill calls the npmscan MCP server's tools (listed under "Tools used"
below). They only read public package data: no API key or account, nothing is
installed or changed on the user's machine, and the only server contacted is
https://npmscan.com/api/mcp.
- Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Kimi, Grok: the npmscan plugin connects
the server for you.
- OpenClaw:
openclaw mcp add npmscan --url https://npmscan.com/api/mcp --transport streamable-http,
then openclaw mcp doctor npmscan --probe to check it.
- Any other MCP client: add a remote (streamable HTTP) server with that URL.
Some clients prefix tool names with the server name (for example
npmscan__get_package). If the tools aren't available at all, tell the user
how to connect them for their client instead of answering from memory.
Steps
- Baseline with
get_package(orget_package_versionif the user gave an
exact version). Pull deprecated, maintenanceSummary,
possibleTyposquatOf, isLatestVersionVulnerable/highestSeverity,
downloadTrend, and days-since-last-publish. This alone answers a good
chunk of "should I trust this" and grounds the deeper checks that follow —
don't skip straight to the maintainer/provenance tools without it. If
get_package_version comes back with versionExists: false, that version
is no longer on npm but OSV still has advisories for it — usually a
release npm pulled for being malicious (ua-parser-js 0.7.29, debug
4.4.2). Report its vulnerabilities as real; it is not a "not found."
- Check for malware. Every vulnerability finding carries
isMalware— true
for a confirmed-malicious package (an OSV MAL-* record, or a GitHub
advisory with CWE-506 such as ua-parser-js's GHSA-pjwm), not an ordinary
bug. Read it on the step-1 findings for this version, and call
query_vulnerabilities({ name }) with no version to see whether ANY
release of this package was ever malicious — a past compromise is worth
naming even when the current version is clean. Any isMalware: true
finding on the version in question is the most severe possible outcome:
report it plainly as known malware, never as "worth verifying."
get_latest_advisories({ type: "malware", affects: name }) (GitHub's
malware feed) and ({ type: "osv", affects: name }) (OpenSSF's) only
cover recently published advisories — useful for a brand-new incident
OSV hasn't indexed yet, but an empty result says nothing about history.
- Call
check_maintainer_changes({ name }). It reconstructs maintainer
add/remove history from the npm packument and flags:
- a maintainer added recently who then published shortly after (the
account-takeover pattern behind the Sept 2025 chalk/debug "qix"
compromise and ua-parser-js),
- a full sudden replacement of the maintainer list,
- a long-standing maintainer quietly dropped,
- a maintainer-list change on npm not yet tied to any release — flag this
as the more urgent case, since access changed hands but nothing has
shipped with it yet, so there's no version to warn the user off of.
Also reports GitHub repository transfer/archival — a transfer isn't
automatically hostile (e.g. jade → pug was a documented rename), say so
rather than treating every transfer as a red flag. If it flags a newly
added or fully turned-over maintainer, immediately follow up with
check_maintainer_blast_radius({ maintainerUsername }) on that account
— it lists every other package the same account currently touches and
flags a tight cluster of packages published within a short window of
each other, the compromised-account shape behind incidents like the 2025
chalk/debug ("qix") compromise and the 2026 keyv/cacheable "Shai-Hulud"
worm. Don't stop at the one named package if the maintainer signal is
already concerning — a tight cluster across several packages is a
materially worse finding than a single-package maintainer change, and
this is a single-package investigation's best chance to catch that
before the user asks about the next affected package separately. A large
totalPackagesFound alone is not a red flag; only a tight cluster is. A
cluster note starting "Discounted:" means it's at least 30 days old and
OSV.dev lists no malware for its versions — a past burst that stayed
clean, not a current threat; one naming a malware advisory is the
opposite.
- Call
check_package_provenance({ name, version }). Three checks in one
call: does the Sigstore build attestation's source repo/commit match
package.json's declared repository; is this version missing provenance
while its npm-scope or maintainer peers consistently publish with it (a
real anomaly, not just "no provenance" — a version published before npm
provenance existed, 2023-04-19, skips this comparison, and peers.note
says so); and does the tarball's actual install scripts/
dependencies match what's committed at the attested source commit — a
script or dependency on npm that was never committed in source is the
stolen-npm-token publish pattern. This is structural verification, not a
cryptographic re-check of the Sigstore bundle — say so if the user asks
how deep it goes. For a version npm no longer lists, this tool returns a
not-found error that names any OSV advisories — use those, don't stop at
the 404.
- If
get_package/get_package_versionin step 1 showed
hasLifecycleScripts/a preinstall/postinstall/prepare entry, follow
up with analyze_install_script({ name, version }). It fetches the
published tarball and statically scans the script — and the files it
references — against npmscan's red-flags rubric (child_process,
network calls, .ssh/.aws/.npmrc/TOKEN/KEY access,
obfuscation, remote binaries off untrusted hosts, exfil endpoints,
eval-on-decoded-content), returning a totalScore/riskTier. A nonzero
score isn't automatically malicious — a legitimate binary download (e.g.
cypress) scores nonzero too — so report the actual findings, not just
the score. A prepare-only package scores 0 unless its command does
something alarming: npm never runs a dependency's prepare on install.
- If the combined picture ends up genuinely concerning (a maintainer-
takeover pattern, a malware finding, a provenance mismatch, a
possibleTyposquatOf hit, or a critical install-script finding), offer — don't force —
suggest_alternative({ name, reason }) with reason set to whichever of
"vulnerable"/"abandoned"/"typosquat"/"general" best fits, so the
user has a next step instead of just a warning.
- Produce one findings report, most-concerning signal first:
- State the verdict per check plainly (e.g. "no maintainer-change red
flags in the lookback window," not silence-as-clean).
- Every finding from
check_maintainer_changes/check_package_provenance
is a hedged signal meant to prompt verification, not proof — say
"worth verifying independently," matching the tools' own language,
especially for anything below their high/critical tiers.
- Include the
npmscanUrlso the user can read the full write-up. - If nothing turned up anything but a low/none
riskTierand no maintainer
or provenance findings, say so plainly — this skill exists to give
confident "looks clean" answers as often as it flags real risk.
Do not
- Do not run this skill's checks across every package in a list — that's
dependency-audit's job, and check_maintainer_changes/
check_package_provenance are deliberately reserved there for
already-flagged packages only, not a full inventory.
- Do not treat a missing
provenancefield, a repository transfer, or a
single maintainer addition as confirmed compromise on its own — report
what the tool actually flagged (or didn't) and let the riskTier/points
speak, don't editorialize past it.
- Do not skip
get_packageand jump straight to the deep checks — the
baseline (deprecated, popularity/maintenance tiers, typosquat) is cheap
and often already answers the question.
- Do not invent a replacement package name yourself — let
suggest_alternative return its own whySuggested/nonPackageAlternatives
rather than guessing.
- Do not silently skip
analyze_install_scriptwhen lifecycle scripts exist
just because check_maintainer_changes/check_package_provenance came
back clean — a legitimate maintainer can still ship a genuinely risky
script, and vice versa; report all applicable signals, not just whichever
ran first.
- Do not skip
check_maintainer_blast_radiusoncecheck_maintainer_changes
flags a newly added or fully turned-over maintainer — that combination is
exactly when the follow-up matters most, not an optional extra step.
- Do not treat a large
totalPackagesFoundfromcheck_maintainer_blast_radius
as a red flag by itself — many legitimate maintainers publish hundreds of
packages over a career. Only a tight-cluster finding (several packages'
latest versions landing within a short window of each other) is the
actual signal.
- Do not soften an
isMalware: truefinding into a hedged "worth verifying"
the way a check_maintainer_changes/check_package_provenance signal is
— it is a confirmed report of malicious code, not a heuristic.
- Do not treat an empty
get_latest_advisoriesmalware/osv result as a
clearance — those feeds only cover recent advisories. The isMalware
flags on the OSV findings are the malware check.
- Do not read a
versionExists: falseresult, or a provenance not-found
error that names advisories, as "the version doesn't exist so it's fine" —
that is exactly how npm removes malicious releases.
- Do not attempt to install, upgrade, or publish packages yourself; this
skill only reads data through NPMScan's read-only MCP tools.
Tools used
get_package, get_package_version, query_vulnerabilities,
get_latest_advisories, check_maintainer_changes,
check_maintainer_blast_radius, check_package_provenance,
analyze_install_script, suggest_alternative
— all provided by the npmscan MCP server bundled with this plugin
(.mcp.json). See references/test-prompts.md
for prompts to manually verify this skill after installing or editing it.