1.1k prompt-security

nanoclaw-traffic-guardian Skill

NanoClaw 运行时流量监控基线,用于宿主机侧代理检查,提供容器安全的 MCP 与 IPC 状态接口。

安装方式:把技能目录放入 ~/.claude/skills/(Claude Code)或在 claude.ai 设置中启用;也可复制右侧安装命令一键添加。

查看源码

技能指令原文(SKILL.md)

NanoClaw Traffic Guardian

This is a baseline specification skill. It intentionally does not ship a proxy or runtime implementation yet.

Vercel Skills Installation

Install with the Vercel Skills CLI for this harness:

npx skills add prompt-security/clawsec --skill nanoclaw-traffic-guardian -a openclaw -y

Release Artifact Verification

For standalone installs, verify the signed release manifest before trusting SKILL.md, skill.json, or the archive. The skill.json file is the package metadata/SBOM source, and the release pipeline signs checksums.json with the ClawSec release key.

set -euo pipefail

SKILL_NAME="nanoclaw-traffic-guardian"
VERSION="0.0.1-beta5"
REPO="prompt-security/clawsec"
TAG="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}"
BASE="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}"
ZIP_NAME="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}.zip"
TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT

RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256="711424e4535f84093fefb024cd1ca4ec87439e53907b305b79a631d5befba9c8"

curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.sig" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/signing-public.pem" -o "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/$ZIP_NAME" -o "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/SKILL.md" -o "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/skill.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256="$(openssl pkey -pubin -in "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" -outform DER | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')"
if [ "$ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256" != "$RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: signing-public.pem fingerprint mismatch" >&2
  exit 1
fi

openssl base64 -d -A -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" -out "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin"
openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin -pubin \
  -inkey "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" \
  -sigfile "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" \
  -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" >/dev/null

hash_file() {
  if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
  else
    sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
  fi
}

verify_manifest_file() {
  asset="$1"
  path="$2"
  expected="$(jq -r --arg asset "$asset" '.files[$asset].sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")"
  if [ -z "$expected" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing $asset" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
  actual="$(hash_file "$path")"
  if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: checksum mismatch for $asset" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
}

expected_archive="$(jq -r '.archive.sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")"
if [ -z "$expected_archive" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing archive.sha256" >&2
  exit 1
fi
actual_archive="$(hash_file "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME")"
if [ "$actual_archive" != "$expected_archive" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: archive checksum mismatch" >&2
  exit 1
fi

verify_manifest_file "SKILL.md" "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
verify_manifest_file "skill.json" "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

echo "Signed release manifest, archive, SKILL.md, and skill.json verified."

Only install or extract the archive after this verification succeeds.

Scope

Builders should use this skill as the NanoClaw landing zone for runtime traffic monitoring:

  • host-side HTTP proxy inspection
  • optional HTTPS inspection with host-held CA material
  • outbound exfiltration detection
  • inbound injection detection
  • redacted local threat logs
  • MCP tools for status, findings, and config checks
  • IPC handlers for container-safe host communication

Prefer this as an optional companion to clawsec-nanoclaw, not as a mandatory extension of the existing advisory/signature/integrity suite.

Safety Contract

  • Opt-in only.
  • Detect-and-log by default.
  • No automatic system CA installation.
  • No CA private key access from the container.
  • No blocking in the first implementation.
  • Redact secrets before logs or MCP responses.
  • Keep all state under NANOCLAW_TRAFFIC_GUARDIAN_HOME or the host-managed NanoClaw security data directory.

Builder Entry Points

Read SPEC.md before implementing. Use the placeholder folders as follows:

| Path | Intended use |
|---|---|
| lib/ | Detector rules, redaction, types, report formatting |
| host-services/ | Host-side proxy lifecycle, log access, IPC handlers |
| mcp-tools/ | Container-side MCP tools for status and findings |
| test/ | Unit tests, host/container IPC tests, redaction tests |

Required First Implementation Behavior

  1. Validate config without starting the proxy.
  2. Start monitor through a host-managed lifecycle path.
  3. Keep CA key material on the host side.
  4. Inspect HTTP request/response text up to a bounded byte limit.
  5. Support optional HTTPS MITM only when the operator supplies per-runtime trust configuration.
  6. Emit JSONL findings with redacted snippets.
  7. Expose MCP tools that return status and redacted findings only.

Out of Scope for v0.0.1 Implementation

  • automatic system trust-store mutation
  • transparent network interception
  • default blocking
  • sending traffic to external services
  • exposing raw request/response bodies to the container